Cooperatives, Regulation and Competition in Norwegian Agriculture by Tennbakk, Berit
 
Cooperatives, Regulation and 















Paper prepared for presentation at the X
th EAAE Congress 
‘Exploring Diversity in the European Agri-Food System’, 











Copyright 2002 by Berit Tennbakk. All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 
copyright notice appears on all such copies.  
 
  Corresponding author, ECON Centre for Economic Analysis, P.O.Box 327 Sentrum, 4002 
STAVANGER, Norway. Phone: +47 51.53.95.66, fax: +47 51.53.95.69, e-mail: bte@econ.no. 
  
Cooperatives, regulation and 







Over production is a persistent and costly problem in Norwegian agriculture. 
Support to agricultural production implicitly yields incentives to produce too 
much, i.e., causing market prices to fall below the target level, and thereby 
increasing the need for subsidies and additional market interventions. In order to 
restrict supplies, farmers are allowed to coordinate through marketing 
cooperatives. The paper argues that this coordination is likely to be insufficient in 
markets where the cooperative competes with an investor-owned wholesaler. 
Interventions in the market in order to remove excess supplies may induce further 
incentives to increase production. Levying a tax on all production in order to 
cover market regulation costs, moves the solution in the right direction but is 
impotent in restoring the target (second-best) level of production.  
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1  Introduction 
Despite the fact that Norwegian agricultural markets are thoroughly 
regulated, over production is a persistent and costly problem. The regulatory 
system is complex and involves a number of different goals, means and agents. 
Hence, it is not straightforward to penetrate and to pinpoint the major reason why 
regulations are not able to target total market supply better. We will argue that 
competition between a marketing cooperative and private wholesalers, and the 
cooperative’s dual role as a market player and government agent contribute the 
problem of over production. 
Marketing cooperatives play an important role in Norwegian agricultural 
markets. In the markets for dairy products, meat, and eggs and poultry, the large 
national cooperatives have market shares of about 60 % to almost 100 % in the 
first level handling of domestic production.1 Moreover, the markets are protected 
against imports by tariffs, and most of domestic demand for the goods based on 
these primary products is covered by domestic production. Hence, the 
cooperatives’ market shares in the final market are high as well.  
In addition to their role as major market players, the cooperatives are used 
as government agents and are instrumental in the implementation of agricultural 
policies. This combination of being a market player and at the same time a 
regulator is often, and for obvious reasons, referred to as the dual role of 
cooperatives.  
There are several reasons why the government supports domestic 
agriculture. The natural conditions, i.e., the Norwegian climate and landscape, are 
not particularly suited for efficient agricultural production, and Norwegian 
agriculture is generally not profitable based on world market prices.2 Hence, in 
order to sustain Norwegian agriculture, farmers need income transfers or market 
protection to make a living from their farming. In addition to various subsidies 
and transfers that are differentiated in order to regulate the geographical 
distribution of farms, the yearly negotiations between farmers’ organizations and 
the government determines an income target for farmers and the distribution of 
that income according to two main sources. The first source is the market, where 
analyses of the demand structure are used to estimate a target market price for an 
estimated total supply in the year ahead. The second source is the direct transfers, 
which in effect are calculated as the residual, i.e., the income needed in addition to 
the estimated income from the market in order to reach the income target. 
In order for the targets to be reached, the large marketing cooperatives are 
instrumental and used as agents for the government. There are two main reasons 
why cooperatives are assigned such a role. First, the cooperative organization of 
farmers enables coordination of production and thereby control of market supply. 
In order to reach the target market price, it is necessary to restrict total supply. In 
                                                 
1   Agricultural cooperatives have relatively large market shares in many European countries. According to 
Bergman (1997) Swedish cooperatives have market shares of 70 – 100%, and have strong market 
positions in countries like Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands as well.  
2  To the extent that world market prices are artificially low due to agricultural policies elsewhere, this does 
not help improve the competitiveness of Norwegian agriculture.   2 
other words, target market prices are above marginal costs for the estimated 
consumption. Second, the cooperatives distribute the entire surplus from all its 
activities to the members via the price of the primary product. Hence, the residual 
required income, which is covered by direct transfers, can be set at a minimum. 
Given the social cost of taxation, this minimizes the costs of regulation as well. At 
least this is basically the idea of how the system should ideally work.   
Another basic feature is the farmers’ freedom to choose wholesale 
affiliation. The resulting market structure is one where the cooperative holds a 
dominant market position, but where a proportion of farmers choose to market 
their production through private wholesalers. Given the cooperative’s obligation 
to employ open membership policies, the investor-owned wholesalers have to 
match the cooperative’s pricing policies in order to attract farmers. On the other 
hand, to some extent, the cooperatives ‘hands are tied’, i.e., it is committed to a 
given strategy, and in that respect, the investor-owned wholesalers can determine 
their market strategy, knowing the strategy of the cooperative. As a result, the 
cooperative can not perfectly control the total market supply. 
As a market regulator, the cooperative is obliged to employ an open 
membership policy and it must accept all deliveries offered, even deliveries from 
non-member farmers. In order for the cooperative to make necessary adjustments 
to sustain the target price, it has to be able to handle any excess supplies. If excess 
supplies are not handled, the market price will fall below the target price. In the 
egg market this has been the case in eight of the ten years between 1989 and 1999.  
Excess supplies can be handled in two basic ways; Farmers can be paid to 
deliver less, or production can be kept out of the market. When farmers are paid to 
deliver less it usually entails compensation to slaughter live stock animals earlier 
than what is optimal according to the production cycle, i.e., reduce the production 
capacity temporarily.3 Excess production can be kept out of the market by 
exports, storage or processing.4 Hence, the role of regulator involves extra costs. 
These costs are reimbursed. The compensation is financed by general tax money 
or by a special tax levied on all production of the product in question. In the egg 
market this tax has been positive in the years 1989 to 1999. I.e., excess production 
has to some extent led prices to fall below the target price, and has to some extent 
been ’regulated’ out of the market.  
In addition, a maximum price is set in order to prevent the exploitation of 
consumers by market power. In other words, the cooperative is chosen to act as a 
market regulator because of its ability to coordinate supplies, but is prevented to 
use this ability unduly (to set prices above the target price). The maximum price is 
generally not binding.  
Using the egg market as an example, the resulting market structure involves 
a marketing cooperative that markets about two thirds of the total domestic egg 
production and two investor-owned wholesalers. The investor-owned wholesalers 
do however appear to have split the ‘free’ farmers geographically between them, 
                                                 
3   In the egg market the compensation is given to producers who slaughter hens early and do not replace 
them within a specified time frame. 
4  In order to store agricultural produce it is often necessary to preserve or process inputs into products 
which yield much lower prices than fresh produce.   3 
and hence, do not compete with each other for deliveries.5 In effect, the regional 
markets are characterized by what may be termed “duopsony”. The two investor-
owned wholesalers employ different strategies faced with the competition with the 
cooperative. One reports to ‘mimic’ the price conditions of the cooperative 
exactly, but to let farmers set their quantities more freely. In that case the 
profitability of the wholesale operation must hinge upon an ability to do business 
more cost-efficiently than the cooperative. The other reports to guarantee 
suppliers a fixed price (the market price minus a fixed margin), but for a given 
production quantity. In principle, both investor-owned wholesalers can choose the 
number of suppliers whose production they offer to supply.   
In this paper the focus is on the competitive implications of the market 
structure described above. The analysis demonstrates that investor-owned firms 
can strategically adjust to the competition from a cooperative, and be able to 
sustain profitability in the market. We discuss the different strategies employed by 
the Norwegian wholesalers and discuss the optimal strategy of an investor-owned 
wholesaler, given the cooperatives market role and strategy. Moreover, we 
demonstrate that the investor-owned firms’ competitive strategies and interaction 
with the cooperative, may contribute to the problems of excess supply, and hence 
increase the social costs of regulation. 
2  Theory 
Generally, cooperatives come in many different sizes and forms, and there is 
no consensus definition of cooperatives as economic agencies in the economic 
literature (see, e.g., LeVay, 1983). However, in this setting we are looking at large 
marketing cooperatives whose primary objective is to maximize members’ 
revenues. The members of the cooperative are independent farmers who market 
all their production through the cooperative, and the cooperative acts as a joint 
agent for its members. As members of the cooperative the farmers hold the 
residual claim on the profit generated in the marketing chain. The farmers are 
interested in maximizing the total revenue from the market, i.e., the sum of profits 
from the farm level and the profits from the wholesale or processing level.6  
According to theory, a marketing cooperative can basically distribute the 
revenue from the market in two different ways: According to an NARP-pricing 
rule or according to an NMRP-pricing rule. NARP stands for Net Average 
Revenue Product and NMRP for Net Marginal Revenue Product. An NARP-
pricing cooperative distributes all revenue through the price paid to farmers, i.e.; 
farmers receive a payment for each unit marketed through the cooperative which 
                                                 
5  The downstream market has become increasingly concentrated and is currently controlled by 4 national 
retail chains. This implies that the downstream market is also divided between the wholesalers because 
the retail chains prefer to sign exclusive contracts with one wholesaler. This has probably made 
coordination between the wholesalers easier, but the basic structure of the upstream egg market has not 
changed significantly with the increased downstream concentration.   
6 This formulation of the cooperative's objective is accredited to Enke (1945) and Taylor (1971). Pursuing 
this objective, the coopeative makes the greatest possible joint revenue for the member farmers.    4 
is equal to the average revenue of the cooperative firm.7 An NMRP cooperative 
pays the member farmers a price equal to the marginal revenue from the market 
(net of marketing costs), and distributes remaining profits independent of the 
volume marketed by each individual farmer.8 Assuming that farmers choose their 
production individually, the revenue distribution rule chosen by the cooperative 
has implications for the quantity each farmer supplies, and hence for the total 
supplies to the market.  
The large Norwegian marketing cooperatives employ a variety of NARP 
pricing. In the economic literature it is generally assumed that an NARP 
cooperative is not able to control the individual members’ production and exploit 
market power.  Therefore, it is traditionally concluded that when an NARP 
cooperative is present in a market, total output is increased and efficiency 
enhanced, compared to the unregulated private solution where investor-owned 
wholesalers are able to exploit market power towards farmers (Helmberger, 1964 
and 1966, and Helmberger and Hoos, 1962). Even NMRP cooperatives will 
expand production relative to the unregulated solution because it will not be 
interested in exploiting market power towards farmers (see e.g., Sexton, 1990, and 
Tennbakk, 1994).9 
However, the Norwegian cooperatives implement a form of two-part tariff, 
in which deliveries within a preset ’quota’ for each farmer are paid according to 
the NARP revenue distribution rule, whereas excess deliveries are paid at a much 
lower price, typically the export price. As argued, a major reason for choosing the 
cooperatives as regulatory agents, is their ability to restrict total supply. Hence, it 
can be argued that although the Norwegian cooperatives are NARP cooperatives 
in the sense that they distribute profits through prices, they are NMRP 
cooperatives in the sense that they restrict their members' supplies.   
If the cooperative competes with investor-owned wholesalers over supplies 
and employs an open membership policy, the investor-owned wholesalers, too, 
have to raise the price paid to farmers as compared to the market without 
cooperatives. As mentioned, markets where cooperatives and private wholesalers 
compete are quite commonly found in agriculture. However, in the economic 
literature, this is viewed as an off-equilibrium situation. Either the cooperative is 
able to increase prices in the end market and offer farmers better terms than the 
competitors (Rhodes, 1983), or the investor-owned wholesalers are able to mimic 
the conditions of the cooperative (Helmberger, 1964). In both cases the long term 
market structure is one with one large or several small cooperatives in the former 
case,10 or one with only investor-owned wholesalers in the latter case.11 The 
                                                 
7   NARP = p – k(Q)/Q, where p is the price in the final market, k(Q) is the cost of marketing, and Q is the 
total quantity marketed by the cooperative.  
8  Zusman (1982) shows that cost distribution rules involving marginal cost pricing can be attained through 
majority voting.  
9  Farmers are assumed to be easily exposed to exploitation by private wholesalers because they are small 
compared to the market and more geographically dispersed than consumers.   
10  Tennbakk (1994) shows that in a market where an exclusive marketing cooperative competes with one 
private wholesaler in duopoly, the nonmember farmers are worse off than in private duopoly. If these 
farmers can not become members of the existing cooperative, their rational response is to set up their own 
cooperative.   5 
NMRP cooperative, pays farmers a price for their input equal to the marginal 
income from the market, and distributes remaining revenues independent of 
patronage. Hence, a cooperative applying an NMRP pricing rule, may be much 
more powerful when it comes to controlling members’ output, and will not be 
‘rendered powerless in the market’, as conjectured by Rhodes (1983).  
The Norwegian marketing cooperatives enjoy market power in the final 
market and are able to restrict their members’ production. Still, we observe that 
there is obviously room for investor-owned wholesalers in the market. This paper 
presents a model where the equilibrium is a mixed market where both the open 
membership cooperative and the investor-owned firm make positive revenues, and 
farmers are indifferent as to which processor to patronize.  
3  The model 
3.1  Industry cost structure 
At the outset the market consists of N independent farmers, one marketing 
cooperative and one investor-owned wholesaler. For simplicity it is assumed that 
the wholesale or processing plants are already set up, and investment costs are 
sunk. There are economies of scale in distribution or processing, exceeding the 
scope of the individual farm.12 The cost function of the wholesale activity is 
assumed to exhibit constant marginal costs, for simplicity normalized to zero.13 
Let the industry costs of production be expressed by the cost function 
C(Q,L), where Q is the final product and L is a necessary input in production. The 
model employed is similar to models found in some of the horizontal integration 
literature, e.g., Perry and Porter (1985) and Gaudet and Salant (1992). In this 
setting, however, the number of farmers constituting the cooperative (integrating 
horizontally) is endogenous.14 The production function exhibits constant returns 
to scale and the cost function implicitly includes the input prices of all variable 
factors.15 Thus, the cost function is linearly homogeneous in Q and L. Marginal 
costs are homogeneous of degree zero in Q and L. Let L be the supply of land, and 
let the supply of land be fixed and normalized to 1. Then the marginal cost 
function C1(Q,1) is increasing in Q. Hence, the marginal cost function expresses 
the industry competitive supply curve. 
                                                                                                                                      
11  The cooperative organization expands production and forces the private firms to raise their price. In the 
long run, all firms produce at minimum efficient scale and farmers are indifferent between supplying the 
private firm and the cooperative. (LeVay, 1983) 
12  Assuming, e.g., a cost structure similar to the one employed in Rasmusen et.al. (1991). 
13 Helmberger (1964) and Rhodes (1983), referring to Youde (1978), both argue that diseconomies are 
rarely encountered in food processing. 
14  Kamien and Zang (1990) endogenize the decision to merge. In their model, however, the insider firms 
must approve of one more firm being part of the merger, an assumption that does not apply to open 
membership cooperatives. 
15  C = C (Q, L) ≡ minz vz s.t. [Q - f (z, L) ≤ 0] where v is the vector of input prices for the variable inputs z, 
and f is the production function.   6 
The fixed factor is distributed among a large, but finite number of farmers, 
N, who produce the raw product on independent farms. Total production is given 
by Q = Σi qi, i = 1, ... , N, where qi is the production at farm i. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that all farmers own an equal share of the fixed factor and have identical 
cost functions.16 Since the industry marginal cost function is homogeneous of 
degree zero, the individual cost structure mirrors the industry cost function. 
Moreover, the industry competitive supply curve does not change with the 
distribution of the fixed factor between firms. Hence, the identical farm cost 
functions are characterized by 
(1)  ) ( i i q c c =   0 > i c    0 > i c  
where c'i is the individual farm's supply function. 
For illustrative purposes, we will do calculations on specific functional 
forms where needed. In these calculations we assume that the industry cost curve 
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Further, let the inverse demand function be linear and expressed by 
(4)  P C Q Q Q p − − = − = 1 1   
QC and QP are the quantities marketed by the cooperative and the investor-
owned wholesaler, respectively. 
3.2  The cooperative’s market behavior 
The members of the cooperative market all their production through the 
cooperative. Holding the residual claim on the firm’s surplus, the cooperative 
members share the profit from the cooperative marketing channel. The profit of 
each cooperative member is the sum of farm profits and the share of cooperative 
profits. Acting as an agent for its members, the cooperative takes the costs at the 
farm level into account when choosing its optimal quantity. From the literature, 
see, e.g., LeVay (1983), we know that the NMRP pricing cooperative maximizes 
joint profits, whereas the NARP pricing cooperative does not. The Norwegian 
cooperatives are NARP cooperatives, but employs NARP pricing in combination 
with a quota system. According to this system, supplies exceeding the quota are 
paid at a lower price (which can be normalized to zero). Since all farmers are 
assumed to be equal, this combined NARP pricing and quota system is equivalent 
to an NMRP pricing scheme. Hence, it is assumed that the cooperative can 
effectively control its members' supplies.   
If the government is interested in minimizing the direct income transfer to 
the farmers, it makes sense to let farmers behave as a cartel.17 If all farmers are 
                                                 
16 The system of direct transfers does to a large extent even out cost differences among farmers.  
17  The cooperative monopoly price is different from the price set by an investor-owned monopoly because 
the cooperative does not exploit monopsony power towards farmers (see, e.g., Tennbakk, 1994). In reality 
of course, the government is also concerned with the distribution effects of the policies, but since the case   7 
members of the cooperative, i.e., n = N, the cooperative maximizes joint profits 
by restricting output to the monopoly or cartel solution, QM, solving 
(5)  ) ( ) ( Q C Q Q p max
M
Q − = Π  
Each farmer earns a profit of Π
M/N.  
This solution is equal to the cartel solution, and as such has the usual 
undesirable incentive structure.18 Since  p ci <
' , it is profitable for an individual 
farmer to deviate from the cooperative solution, where, and expand output until 
p ci =
' . In fact any 
M
i i q q > as long as  p ci ≤
' will give extra profits. It is, 
however, assumed that the minimum efficient scale of marketing exceeds the 
production of one individual farmer. Provided that fixed costs are not too high, it 
may, however, be profitable for an investor-owned wholesaler to establish 
business if he can attract a sufficient number of suppliers.  
With the specified demand and cost functions the monopoly price is equal to 
3 / 2 =
M p , the total quantity produced is  3 / 1 = M Q  and the marginal cost is 
3 / 1 1 =
M C . The farmers earn an equal share of the monopoly profit, πi
M = 1/(6N). 
3.3  Mixed market with price/quantity contracts 
Now, let there be two wholesale channels available to the farmers, one 
cooperative and one investor-owned wholesaler, and let the number of farmers 
who are members of the cooperative be n, n ≤ N. The remaining (N-n) farmers 
patronize the investor-owned wholesaler. The cooperative can legally coordinate 
and restrict its members’ supplies, conditional on open membership policies. No 
other market regulations are employed. 
3.3.1  The cooperative 
As in the cooperative monopoly solution, each member of the cooperative 
will produce an equal share of the cooperative quantity. The aggregate cost 
function of the cooperative farmers is 
(6)  ) ( ) (
C
i C q nc Q c =    
C
i C nq Q = , i = 1,...,n.  
The joint profit of the cooperating farmers is 
(7)  ) ( ) ( C C P C
C
Q Q c Q Q Q p max
C
− + = Π  
The joint production of the cooperative, QC, is set so as to maximize total 
profits, given the supply of the private wholesaler. The first-order condition of the 
maximization problem, equation (4), yields the regular Cournot reaction function 
(8)  ) , ; ( N n Q R Q P
C















And, as for the normal Cournot reaction function, the cooperative’s quantity 
is decreasing in the rival’s quantity. Moreover, the cooperative quantity must be 
increasing in n, because the total cost of producing any amount of output is 
                                                                                                                                      
we study is the one where market prices fall below the target price, no generality is lost by this 
assumption.  
18  Recall that it is voluntary to participate in the cartel agreement, i.e., to be a member of the cooperative.   8 
decreasing in n. The more farmers are members of the cooperative, the cheaper 
the cooperating farmers can produce any joint quantity.   
3.3.2  The investor-owned wholesaler 
The investor-owned wholesaler offers a contract to the (N-n) farmers who 
are not members of the cooperative. It is assumed that he knows the cooperative’s 
objective and the terms the cooperative offers to its members (price and quota).  
Let us first study the case where the wholesaler offers the (N-n) ’free’ 
farmers a contract that specifies a price, w, and a quantity qj
P to be purchased from 
each farmer. The price/quantity combinations are set so as to maximize profits 
from the wholesale operation.  
(9)  P
P
w Q Q w p max
P
) (
, − = Π  
QP = (N-n)qj
P,  j = n+1, …, N. Since the cooperative employs open 
membership policies, the investor-owned wholesaler has to offer conditions that 
ensure each of the ‘free’ farmers profits that are at least as high as the profits of 
each of the cooperative farmers. Each cooperative member earns an equal share of 
total profits,  n
C C
i / Π = π , i = 1, ..., n, i.e., the farmers patronizing the private 
wholesaler must make 
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Since the investor-owned wholesaler maximizes profits, the restriction on 
farmers’ profits must hold as equality, and the investor-owned wholesaler’s 
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Hence, the surplus on the farms indirectly enters into the investor-owned 
wholesaler's objective function. The first-order condition reads 
(12) 



































When determining the optimal quantity to market, the investor-owned 
wholesaler takes into account not only the quantity effect on market prices, but 
also the effect on the profit of the cooperative farmers. This is captured by the 
third term on the right-hand side of equation (12). Since we have that  






























the cooperative’s profit is decreasing in QP, and the increase in the investor-
owned wholesaler’s expenditure, when the private wholesaler's supplies increase, 
is less than the increase in costs for the ’free’ farmers. Hence, the private 
wholesaler markets a higher quantity than in a symmetric duopoly for two 
reasons. First, he has to treat the ‘free’ farmers’ costs as if they were internal 
costs. If his opponent was not an open membership cooperative, he could act as a 
monopsonist towards the free farmers and would market a lower quantity. Second, 
the cost effect of increasing supplies is counteracted by a reduction in cooperative 
profits, which induces yet higher production.  
Clearly, the resulting market supply is higher than the cartel quantity, and 
market prices correspondingly lower. Moreover, it is higher than the ‘pure’   9 
Cournot and Stackelberg solutions as well.19 To see this, note that the leader’s 
optimality condition in Stackelberg duopoly would be equal to equation (12) 
except for the third term, which relates to the open membership policies of the 
cooperative. The effect of this term is to increase the supply of the Stackelberg 
leader as shown in equation (13).  
Using the specific cost and demand functions, equations (2) to (4), yields 
quantities  
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The mixed market yields greater supply than the cooperative monopoly (n = 
N), and total supply is greater the more farmers patronize the investor-owned 
wholesaler, as shown in equation (16) 
(16)  0
) 2 ( ) 4 (
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If one farmer leaves the cooperative and starts to supply a private 
wholesaler, total market supply increases, and vice versa. When n = 0, Q = ½, i.e. 
the market solution is equal to the first best or competitive solution. In other 
words, the option on behalf of farmers to form a cooperative is sufficient to deter 
the investor-owned wholesaler from exploiting monopsony power in the market. 
On the other hand, the presence of an investor-owned wholesaler weakens the 
potential market power of the cooperative, i.e. its ability to restrict market supply. 
Each 'free' farmer supplies 









The higher the fraction of farmers who are members of the cooperative, the 
less do the private wholesaler market, but the quantity marketed by each ’free’ 
farmer is greater the fewer they are. In fact, for the given demand and cost 




j q q 2 → , i.e., the ’free’ farmers produce twice as much as the cooperative 




j q q → . One result of competition in the mixed market 
is that farmers who are otherwise identical produce different quantities according 
to their choice of wholesale affiliation. Since farm marginal costs are increasing, 
this means that any given total supply is not produced in the most socially cost 
efficient way.   
The wholesale price paid by the investor-owned wholesaler is derived from 
the profit function for the cooperative and equation (10). The margin made by the 
investor-owned wholesaler is strictly positive 
 (18)    0
) 2 ( 4
1
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19 The term ’pure’ here relates to a situation with two competing cooperatives or two firms treating farm 
costs as internal costs, i.e., they do not exploit monopsony power.    10 
The relationship between the market price, the wholesale price and the 
marginal cost of the ‘free’ farmers is as follows 
(19)     w c p j > > '  
The price paid for the supply from the ‘free’ farmers is lower than their 
marginal costs. If the contract did not specify a quantity associated with the input 
price, the 'free' farmers would chose to produce less. 
The private firms margin is increasing in n, i.e., the private firm makes 
higher profits per unit the higher the cooperatives share of farmers is. Now, total 
profits can be expressed as a function of n. The only extrema of the profit 
function, is found for n = 0 which is a minimum. In other words, the private 
wholesaler prefers that the cooperative have a high market share because that is 
when the market power of the cooperative is strongest. The 'cartel' effect on the 
market price dominates the cost effect of the change in the cooperative profits. 
Taking fixed costs into account, the private wholesaler will be best off 
establishing business at minimum efficient scale, and the market share in long 
term equilibrium is also determined by the level of fixed costs in marketing and/or 
processing. 
3.3.3  Additional market regulations 
The observation that the market frequently produces solutions where prices 
fall below and total supply above the target suggests that the target solution lies 
somewhere in-between the cartel solution and the duopsony solution explored 
above. In order to reduce direct government transfers to farmers, additional 
market regulations are required.  
In order to maintain the target price, the cooperative removes some units 
from the market. As a market regulator on behalf of the government, the costs of 
market regulations are reimbursed. Hence, the profit of the cooperative farmers 
does not change, and the third term of equation (12) is zero. Moreover, the market 
price does not change. If the private wholesaler anticipates this, the first term on 
the right-hand side of expression (12) is zero, as well. The first-order condition is 
reduced to   
(20)  0 '= −c p
T  
where p
T is the target price. Equation (20) states that the private wholesaler 
sets quantity conditions such that the farmers patronizing the private wholesaler 
increase production until marginal costs are equal to the target price. Hence, this 
induces higher supplies from the private wholesaler. Depending on the market 
share of the investor-owned wholesaler, the target price and the cost structure on 
the individual farms, supplies may excel, boosting the costs of market regulations.   
To mitigate this effect, a unit tax is levied on all production. The tax is 










We assume that excess supplies are destroyed at zero costs. QT is market 
demand at the target price, which is, per definition, lower than Q. Hence, t is 
increasing in Q, but at a decreasing rate.  
The tax adds to the cost of the farmers. This shifts the supply curve to the 
left, and reduces the optimal quantity supplied. The tax reduces the optimal supply 
of the cooperative. Moreover, the joint profit of each cooperative farmer is   11 
reduced due to the reduced quantity and the increased cost. The isolated response 
of the private wholesaler will be to increase its quantity; for given costs increased 
supply is the optimal response to reduced cooperative supply. In addition, its costs 
are reduced by the reduction in cooperative profits. However, the cost of the 
farmers supplying the investor-owned wholesaler increases as well, and since they 
produce more than the cooperative farmers, by more than the cost of the 
cooperative farmers. The net effect is to reduce market supply.  
Hence, if excess supplies are to be removed from the market, there is a 
social gain from taxation because it moves the market outcome in the right 
direction, mitigating some of the adverse production incentives of the market 
intervention. However, the price signal is not efficient: The marginal cost of 
destruction is p
T, which is higher than t. 
3.4  Further restrictions on the investor-owned 
wholesaler 
As noted in the introduction, the major investor-owned wholesalers in the 
egg market follow different strategies towards the ‘free’ farmers, and none of 
them report to follow the strategy reported above, even though it is the most 
profitable one. The investor-owned wholesalers' contract design may be limited if 
the farmers object to the idea of producing quantities beyond the point where 
marginal costs exceed the input price paid by the wholesaler. 
The observed alternatives are 1) to mimic the cooperative’s conditions, i.e., 
pay the same price as the cooperative for a fixed quantity, and 2) to pay a fixed 
price w = p – m, and let the farmers freely choose their quantities. We will study 
each in turn. 
3.4.1  The investor-owned wholesaler mimics the cooperative’s 
conditions 
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If this is the case, the private wholesaler cannot make positive profits unless 
he enjoys some kind of cost advantage relative to the cooperative. The cooperative 
may have a cost disadvantage because of the open membership policies, the 
member democracy, extra costs incurred by virtue of the market regulator role or 
simply less efficient processing. The open membership policies may give rise to 
adverse selection problems, e.g., higher transportation costs, and the role as a 
market regulator may require extra costs of holding a larger capacity in order to be 
able to handle excess supplies. However, direct transfers should compensate such 
costs. In a situation where the investor-owned wholesalers actually prefer a 
situation where the cooperative has a high market share, the cooperative is not 
likely to perceive competition as very hard. This can explain why the cooperative 
may be less efficient than an investor-owned firm may.  
3.4.2  The investor-owned wholesaler offers a fixed price 
In the second case we assume that the contract offered by the investor-
owned wholesaler is restricted to a price offer of w, to which the 'free' farmers 
adjust their own production. Still the private wholesaler must make sure that the   12 
’free’ farmers are equally well off as the cooperative farmers in order to attract 
supplies. This situation is equivalent to the model developed by Tennbakk (2001). 
According to this model, a farmer faced with the price offer w, will set his 
production, qj
p, according to  
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The sign of the first derivative follows directly from the maximization 
problem of the investor-owned farmers as stated by equation (11). Even in this 
case, the investor-owned farmers must produce more than the cooperating farmers 
do in order to make the same revenue. If the investor-owned wholesaler sets w = 
c’(qi
C), the farmers patronizing the investor-owned wholesaler will supply the 
same amount to the market as if he were a member of the cooperative, but without 
earning the share of the cooperative profit. In order to compensate for the loss in 
profits, the investor-owned wholesaler has to pay a higher w, and allow his 
suppliers to supply more, i.e., qj
P > qi












Taking into account that farmers must be indifferent between being 
members of the cooperative or patronizing the investor-owned wholesaler, we 
find the equilibrium w as a function of n: 
(25) 
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→ w  as    n → 0 
For any number of members in the cooperative, n, the quantity marketed by 
the private wholesaler is smaller than in the price/quantity contract case. This 
result follows directly from inequality (19). In order to keep the ‘free’ farmers' 
profits at the same level, given restriction (22), each farmers supply must be 
reduced.   
In other words, the quantity marketed by the private wholesaler is lower 
when he has to offer a price contract and let farmers choose their quantities freely 
than when he offers a price/quantity contract. Hence, the social cost of regulations 
is also lower since total supply is lower the lower is the supply of the private 
wholesaler, and the results from the unrestricted model may overstate the over 
production incentives of the current market structure.     13 
4  Concluding remarks  
The aim of the paper is to show that the market structure typical for some 
major agricultural markets in Norway contributes to the observed over production 
problems. One basic feature of these markets is the mixed ownership structure 
where large cooperatives compete with investor-owned wholesalers and the 
farmers are free to chose wholesale affiliation. This market structure is commonly 
found in several other industrialized countries.  
The analysis concludes that the competition from cooperatives mitigates the 
private wholesalers' incentives to exploit market power towards the producers of 
the raw product, i.e. the farmers, and that the competition from the private 
wholesalers mitigate the cooperatives incentives to exploit market power towards 
consumers. The general model demonstrates that such a market solution may be 
sustained as equilibrium and as such contradicts, e.g., Rhodes (1983) intuition that 
the mixed market can generally be regarded as an off-equilibrium situation.    
However, a major concern in Norwegian agricultural policies is to ensure 
that the farmers can subtract a large share of their income from the market. 
Therefore, it is desirable that the market supply is restricted in order to keep prices 
higher than the competitive price and to make sure that farmers receive a large 
share of the market surplus. The ability of the cooperative to restrict its members 
output is instrumental in order to reach the target, but since membership is 
voluntary, the cooperative can not guarantee the target outcome. The coordination 
within the cooperative induces higher prices, which makes the business attractive 
to investor-owned wholesalers as well.  
Since the cooperative farmers' output is restricted, investor-owned 
wholesalers can make a business letting farmers supply a higher quantity than the 
cooperative members do. Except for the case where the investor-owned 
wholesaler exactly mimics the cooperative conditions – and can not make a profit 
unless he is more cost efficient than the cooperative – the competition from the 
investor-owned wholesaler increases total market supply. The resulting market 
price is lower than the target price, and additional market regulations are called 
for.  
If market interventions simply entails removing excess supplies from the 
market and reimburse the costs, then the regulations contributes to the over 
production problem. In practice, the costs are partly or completely covered by a 
levy on all production. This levy mitigates the effect of the market interventions, 
although not perfectly.    14 
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